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familiar with Heidegger's life and writings for the
purpose of learning how to argue the case for antianthropocentrism. Heidegger does not succeed in
developing a convincing case for bis type of antianthropocentrism; indeed, I will argue that there is
sometbing odious about bis critique of anthropocentrism. The interpreter of Heidegger with whom I
will be primarily engaged is Micbael Zimmennan, and
this for two reasons. First, Zimmennan bas made the
most balanced and detailed case for Heidegger as an
important theoretician regarding anti-anthropocentrism.
Indeed, Heidegger's thought is kept alive largely
through talented scbolars like Zimmerman. Second,
although a defender of Heidegger. Zimmerman is
nonetheless willing to listen to criticisms of Heidegger's
Nazism, unlike many dogmatic Heideggerians I have
met. 2 Heidegger's Nazism, I will suggest, is related to
his inability to be persuasive regarding antianthropocentrism. That is, I will avoid ad hominem
arguments in that I will be claiming that Heidegger's
anti-anthropocentrism interpenetrates with his
intellectualized version of Nazism and is, as a
consequence, inadequate for use by animal rightists.
In the following section of the article I will outline
Heidegger's critique of anthropocentrism, especially as
that critique cbanges from the early to the later
Heidegger. My hope in section 2 is not so much to do
original Heidegger research as to indicate in a

Agriculture is today a motorized food industry,
in essence the same as the manufacture of
corpses in gas chambers and extermination
camps, the same as the blockade and starvation
of countries, the same as the manufacture of
atomic bombs.

(Ackerbau is jetzl motorisierte Emahrungsindustrie, im Wesen das Selbe wie die
Fabrikation von Leichen in Gaskammern und
Vemichtungslagern, das Selbe wie die Blockade
und Aushungerung von Landern, das Selbe wie
die Fabrikation von Wasserstoffbomben.)
-Martin Heidegger

I. Introduction.
It is common to be encouraged to consider Heidegger
as a source of wisdom regarding anti-3Ilthropocentrism,
especially because, it is alleged, Heidegger offers a
compelling case against the tradition of Western
antbropocentrism, be teacbes us how to "think"
properly, and he indicates how to dwell authentically
on the earth. 1 The purpose of the present article is to
argue that it is not worth the time and effort to become
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preliminary way what some of the problems are with
several of the best known ideas in Heidegger's work from
the perspective of a version of anti-antlIropocentrism
quite different from Heidegger's, specifically an animal
rights version of anti-anthropocentrism. In section 3 I
will consider Zimmerman's criticisms of Heidegger's
anti-anthropocentrism, criticisms which are notewortlIy
because Zimmerman has developed the most sophisticated defense of environmentalism on a Heideggarian
basis. But I will also try to show in sections 3 and 4 that
some of the defects in Heidegger's thought are found
in Zimmerman's as well, even in the thought of the later
Zimmerman, which is more critical of Heidegger than
the thought of the early Zimmerman. My own criticisms
of Heidegger, and to a lesser extent of Zimmerman,
have to do with the failure to acknowledge (Heidegger)
or to defend consistently (Zimmerman) the rights of
sentient individuals. Heidegger's own hatred of
individualism and of rights was a contributing factor in
his becoming a fascist, but, more importantly for the
purposes of this article, denigration of individual rights
by deep ecologists-including Heideggerian deep
ecologists like Zimmerman-runs tlle danger of
environmental fascism if not of fascism per se.

Aldo Leopold, and with "biocentric egalitarianism," an
egalitarianism which, I will argue, is the most dreadful
imaginable. 3 In Being and TIme, at least, there is a certain
degree of Kantianism in Heidegger's view of nature and
of animals in that, despite the fact that we discover rather
than create nature, including animals, we nonetheless
discover it only within the historical world opened up by
Dasein. Zimmerman puts the issue regarding Heidegger's
minimal anthropocentrism this way:
in Being and Time Heidegger fails to clarify
the following puzzle: do natural entities show
themselves either as instruments or as objects
because these are the two major ontological
dimensions of natural entities in and of
themselves, or instead do natural entities show
themselves as instruments or objects because
these are the only two ways in which human
existence is open for entities. 4
Zimmerman thinks we should commend even the
Heidegger of Being and TIme for avoiding the ethically
bothersome anthropocentrism of the animal rightist's
nemesis, Descartes. Because human beings are ftnite, in
Heidegger's view we cannot be open to entities in ways
that exhaust what they are. But ever since the time of
Plato, and especially since Descartes, we have tended to
be open to them in extremely constricted, onedimensional ways. For Heidegger, who originally defmed
human existence as care (Sorge), we fulftll our humanity
when we exist in a way that lets entities be what they
are instead of forcing them to serve our needs only. By
allowing our understanding to be used solely for the
purpose of dominating entities, we have left the material
world in general and animals in particular as inert and
without intrinsic purpose. To the extent that Dasein is
the measurer in Heidegger's philosophy, it is important
to notice that human temporality is such that as epochs
change entities show themselves in different ways.
Natural entities, including animals, in modem philosophy
often appear as strictly material mechanisms, and this is
largely due to Descartes. These mechanisms are seen
primarily as instruments for socio-economic purposes
or for scientiftc investigation. It is Heidegger's belief
that it is only by reappropriating our philosophical
tradition, by rethinking Plato and Descartes and almost
everyone else between the presocratics and Heidegger
himself, that this bothersome sort of anthropocentrism
can be ameliorated. 5

2. Heidegger's Critique of Anthropocentrism.
Heidegger's fundamental insigllt in Being and TIme is
that there is a difference between Being and entities, (or
beings). We are familiar with entities, like shoes or cows
or numbers. But we have a hard time specifying what
Being or is-ness means. On Heidegger's well-known
view, Being is not an entity but refers to the selfmanifesting, presencing, or revealing of entities. For an
entity to be (Le., to present or manifest itself), a
corresponding absencing is needed, a cle.-'Uing constituted
by human existence. In effect, humans are both a kind of
entity and the clearing in which entities can he manifest.
In this regard there is a minimal and non-botlIersome
anthropocentrism in Heidegger's thought.
For the Heidegger of Being and Time, entities like
animals in some sense would persist if no humans
existed, but they would not "be" in Heidegger's sense
of being manifest within the clearing of human
existence. The anthropocentric tendencies of Being and
TIme, however, yield in Heidegger's later thought,
according to Zimmerman, to a view which is consistent
with most of the principles of deep (as opposed to
supposedly superficial) ecology, with tlIe thought of
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d. Is it not also a bit too convenient to hold, if one
was a dues-paying member of the Nazi Party from
the early 19308 until the end of the war, as was
Heidegger, that technological framing ofnature and
animals is a defect found especially in democratic
or capitalist cultures as well as in socialist ones?
That is, what are anti-anthropocentrists to make of
Heidegger's belief that the Germans (under Hitler)
were the only people capable of bringing about a
new beginning for the West, an anti-anthropocentric
one, in a way at least somewhat analogous to the
Greek beginning two millennia before?9

Heidegger's replacement for the bothersome sort of
anthropocentrism seems to be what he calls "the
fourfold" (das Geviert), a configuration of earth and
sky, mortal beings and the gods, wherein the order of
nature emerges not out of a divine or human plan but
out of the capacity of individuals to behave in their own
ways such that they nonetheless produce an overall
harmony: individuals adjust themselves to other
individuals. 6 The clearing of an open space in our culture
so as to see animals largely reveals them as use values
or as commodities; in a very real sense "primitive"
peoples did not see the same sorts of chickens we see?
Chickens are put in a frame (Gestell) for us by sciencetechnology. And it should be emphasized that there is
no crucial distinction in Heidegger between science and
technology, since science has in recent centuries been
integrally connected to the will to power.
In his later philosophy, Heidegger did not attribute
inauthenticity to a lack of personal resoluteness but to a
cultural phenomenon (i. e., to anthropocentrism).
Authentic human existence in his later philosophy
consists in the realization that humans are but one element
in the fourfold, and not necessarily the most important
one. This realization was never lost by peasants, on
Zimmerman's interpretation of Heidegger, even if it has
been lost (or better, killed) by agribusinessmen on factory
farms. Because we have an obligation, according to
Heidegger, to let things be, it would seem to be worse if
an animal were killed by some human deed than if the
animal were killed naturally.
Several questions need to be asked here, however.

Before moving to Zimmerman's criticisms of
Heidegger and to my own responses to these questions,
I would like briefly to examine Heidegger's approach
to animals, in particular, as opposed to his stance(s)
regarding anti-anthropocentrism in general. This
examination will be crucial for what I have to say later
on in section 4, when I will emphasize the importance
of individual human beings and animals. Frederick
Olafson is correct in noting that for Heidegger animals
(or better, nonhuman animals) do not see entities as
entities and that their vision is not informed by the
categorical distinctions at work in human perception.
Animals have "access" (Zugang) to entities, but, by way
of contrast, human beings perceive entities as such. We
are able to transcend entities toward their being as
entities. Or again, animals are "world-poor" (weltarm)
whereas inanimate things are "worldless" (weltlos).l0
There is a type of reciprocity in animals which is clearly
not found in inanimate things, but it is less clear how
inferior animals are to human beings. Animals are not
worldbuilding (weltbildend) beings, but they do encircle
themselves (Sichumringen) with stimuli in ways that
make inadequate any behavioristic analysis of them.
Their openness to entities nonetheless is not to entities
as entities, and this is apparently because of their failure
to possess language. Rather, their openness is merely
for the purpose of the release of drives. Both
behaviorism and the theory of evolution treat animals
in abstraction from this partial openness, hence
Heidegger holds that animals demand of us a specific
mode of "transposedness" (Versetztsein).ll
In Being and TIme Heidegger makes it clear that
animals can be seen merely as living beings, as can
human beings, from certain points of view. But human
beings can also be seen as rational animals, as living
things which have reason. Such a view ofhuman beings,

a. There is the question of whether the antianthropocentrism entailed in the fourfold is a
variety of anti-humanism, as I will allege, or, as
Zimmerman aIleges, is a type of "higher
humanism" or "beyond humanism"-Zimmennan
cannot decide which to hold. s
b. What are we to make of Heidegger's claim that in
technological culture moral distinctions lose their
meaning? Is this claim actuaIly a ruse for
Heidegger's own inability in his philosophy to
make moral distinctions?
c. Is it not the case that there is something a bit too
convenient in the suggestion that, from a
Heideggerian point of view, World War Two was
due not to Hitler and the Nazis but to forgetfulness
of being? And

Between the Species

28

Winter & Spring 1994

Heidegger's Anti-Anthropocentrism

although not false, nonetheless covers up what is
distinctive about Dasein. That is, the Latin animal
rationale is not quite as accurate as the Greek zoon logon
in that logos refers not only to reason but more
importantly to discourse, 12 and it is discourse, it seems,
which in a way makes a human being half godlike and
hence only half animal:

that all entities are mere objects and that science is the
basic (or me only reliable) source of information. Hence
regarding these views Heidegger was correct, according
to Zimmerman, to be distrustful. However, "insofar as
Heidegger refused to take seriously the organic
dimension of human existence, he may well be accused
of having remained in a curious way tied to the humancentered, dualistic metaphysical tradition of which he
was so critical."16
These criticisms are fine as far as they go, but
regarding (c) Zimmerman only scratches the surface of
what is bothersome about Heidegger's version of antiantllropocentrism, a version which is, as Zimmerman
notes, integrally connected to a reactionary critique not
only of industrialism but also of the whole modem
world, including its notions of rights and autonomy.
Zimmerman's criticism here goes like this:

man understands his mortality as rootedness
in an earth that is what it is by contrast with
heaven or the heavens and tImt is what it is in
light a/the heavens. The contrast is between
the light, clarity, and openness of the heavens
and the darkness, solidity, and impenetrability
of the earth. The earth is both literally and
figuratively lighted by the heavens.'3
Zimmerman himself puts the point in even stronger
terms: because of human discourse humans in a way
are not animals, for to view them as merely naturalistic
animals is to offer the nihilistic version of Aristotle's
theory of human beings as rational animals rather than
Aristotle's own somewhat less problematic version. 14

deep ecologists must examine seriously the
implications of Heidegger's involvement with
National Socialism. His willingness to
support an authoritarian regime to "solve"
the problems posed by modernity and
industrialism, the ease with which he
abandoned the principles of respect of the
rights of others, his talk about a mystical
"union" between Volk and earth, and his
hierarchical views about those "gifted" with
insight about me meaning of history-all this
must give pause to those deep ecologists, most
of whom recognize that authoritarianism,
hierarchism, and communitarianism without
respect for individual freedom are by no means
"solutions" to the environmental crisis ....
Deep ecologists want to be able to speak about
the organic relatedness of all life on earth
without being accused of reverting to fascist
mythologizing. 17

3. Zimmerman's C.-iticisms.
With this brief review of Heidegger's anti-antluopocentrism and of his view of animals as a background,
I will now move to Zimmerman's criticisms. It should
be noted that before 1987 Zimmerman's view of
Heidegger corresponded to tlle "official version" of
Heidegger's political views. His more recent criticisms
of Heidegger, brought on by tile work of Hugo Ott and
Victor Farias,15 constitute an admirable example of
intellectual honesty and the use of critical reason on
Zimmerman's part. In 1990, he called Heidegger to
task on at least three points regarding his antianthropocentrism: (a) Zimmennan, as a self-proclaimed
deep ecologist and radical environmentalist, tllinks tIlat
there is a residual antllfopocentrism in Heidegger's later
thought. Even though tlle later Heidegger abcmdoned
the idea that Dasein is essentially different from all other
entities, he did not integrate humanity into the seamless
web of life described by ecologists, and tllis largely
because Heidegger was always a severe critic of
naturalism. Closely related is (b), Zinunerman's critique
of Heidegger's antipathy to science. It is true that me
sciences which deal with ecological issues and with
animals are often implicated in scientism, or me view
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I would like to make it clear at this point that I am
not claiming, nor is Zimmerman claiming, that
Heidegger's philosophy is worthless because, say, he
never clearly assigned blame to Germany or to the Nazis
orto himselffor events between 1933 and 1945. Rather,
I am only trying to advance me limited claim that there
is a world of difference between, first, an antianthropocentrism which nonetheless acknowledges mat
anthropoi are worthy of respect and are possessors of
rights and, secondly, an anti-anthropocentrism which
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is perversely anti-human, to the point where, as the
quotation at the beginning of this article indicates,
there is no moral difference between machines that
harvest wheat, those that milk cows, and the gas
chambers. Heidegger is an example of the latter antianthropocentrism, whereas Isaac Bashevis Singer is an
example of the fonner. ls
When Singer suggests that animals are constantly
in danger of being sent to a humanly imposed
"Treblinka" or that we often act like Nazis toward
animals, he nonetheless makes it abundantly clear that:
(a) the real Treblinka was a morally evil place, and (b)
the nine million people killed in the death camps-six
million of whom were Jews-constitute a still greater
evil than the very real evil of, say, nine million animals
killed in slaughterhouses or laboratories. Heidegger, by
way of contrast, never condemned Treblinka, leaving
some people to wonder whether he, as a good Nazi to
the end, perhaps approved of it. But even if he had
condemned Treblinka, it is by no means clear that he
would have, or even could have, done so in any tenns
stronger than he could have offered against the killing
of nine million animals or nine million blades of grass.
Even mowing the lawn violates the vague Heideggerian
imperative to let things be (Gelassenheit). Admittedly,
to let things be is not to be purely passive. It is (a) to
open up a clearing in which things disclose themselves
without undue interference and (b) to interact with
things in respectful ways. But Heidegger is not helpful
at all regarding what such respect means in our
dealings with animals.
There is something instructive in the (speciesist)
cliche that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. It
is dangerous both to human and to other animal species
to abandon rights in favor of the obscure notion that we
should let things be. If Zimmennan is to be faulted, it
is on two grounds. First, despite the fact that tlle later
Zimmennan finds the quotation from Heidegger at tlle
beginning of this article "astonishing," he thinks it has
negative implications only regarding our evaluation of
Heidegger's politics and not regarding his antianthropocentrism. And second, although Zimmennan
has largely left behind his earlier (very Heideggerian)
cliticism of rights, he still shows traces of Heidegger's
apparent stance that the Holocaust (and, we could add,
mass extennination of animals)is more due to advanced
technology than it is to a denigration of sentient
individuals (whether pigs or Gypsies). When the later
Zimmennan says that "Mass extennination in tlle Nazi
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camps was possible only because of developments
within industrial technology," it should be noted that
the crucial piece of technology needed for the Holocaust
to occur was the railroad and precise rail scheduling,
which had been in existence since the nineteenth
century. The final solution was far more of a low-tech
operation than Heideggerians like to admit. That is, it
will not do to blame technology simpliciter for
disrespect shown to sentient individuals. 19 The
remainder of this article will consist of an attempt to
expand on Zimmennan's rather mild criticisms of
Heidegger regarding these two areas.
Several of the features ofHeidegger's thought which
some find appealing, such as the idealization of peasant
life contained in his notion of the four-fold, are
nonetheless bothersome both because they appear to
suggest simply a rejection of modem science, rather
than a critical engagement with it, and because they
seem to be connected with a notion of tradition that
entails a rather vicious version of nationalism. Indeed,
Heidegger refers to a new appropriation of Western
tradition by Gennan language and philosophy, but this
newness suggests that proper limits for human behavior
toward other species cannot he established through
current legal or moral fonns but only by Being itself,
whatever that means. As Zimmennan notes, the new
ethos suggested by Heidegger only seems to make sense
if Being is hypostasized and personalized into a divine
agent, as in his well-known claim that only a God can
save us now. 20 Even if Heidegger is correct in claiming
that human beings go astray when they forget that they
are not self-created, it is not clear that reminding us of
that fact helps very much without an explicit statement
of theistic belief on Heidegger's part: if Being is not to
be divinized, why should we believe, along with
Zimmennan, that we are "brought forth so that entities
can manifest themselves "? (my emphasis)21
Zimmennan's earlier thought was very much in the
spirit of Heidegger in the claim that the philosophical
doctrine of human rights justifies exploitation of
nonhuman as well as human beings, presumably
because the doctrine of rights is necessarily tied to
anthropocentrlsm and hence to exploitation in general. 22
Rights, it seems, get in the way of our "primary
obligation": to be open to the Being of entities. But not
even the early Zimmennan favors Heidegger when he
attacks not only rights but the whole project of morality,
as is evidenced in the following puzzling quotation
from Heidegger:
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Every valuing, even where it values positively,
is a subjectivizing. It does not let things be.
Rather, valuing lets beings: be valid-solely
as the object of its doing. 23

Zimmerman thinks that somehow or other we will find
adequate ways of dealing with inevitable conflicts
among individuals and among species without
utilitarianism and without rights theory. He hopes that
somehow or other, by letting things be, these conflicts
will sort themselves out. 28 But surely Zimmerman errs
here by following Heidegger's vagaries. Ethical
problems do not sort themselves out, nor do their
resolutions shine forth with middle-voiced clarity. What
is frustrating about Heidegger's thought is the
inconsistent way in which he does implicitly make
ethical distinctions. Despite the fact that he does not see
any ethical distinction between mechanized agriculture
and the Holocaust, he does see one between a dam on
the Rhine and a HOlderlin poem about the Rhine: to
equate these two is an example of "monstrousness."29
Both Max Scheler and Emmanuel Levinas have
rightly criticized Heidegger for elevating Being over
ethics. The later Zimmerman at least partially follows
Scheler and Levinas in this regard:

It is not surprising that this "leveling gaze," as Richard
Wolin calls it,24 is more compatible with the deep
ecological variety of anti-anthropocentrism than it is
with the animal rights variety. Zimmerman, with John
Rodman on his side,25 does not think that human beings
are in a position to extend rights to other beings if their
own hold on them is questionable. 26
Our supposed obligation to Being does in fact
threaten the loss of hard-won rights. On early
Zimmerman's Heideggerian view, political activism on
behalf of animals itself is part of the problem in that it
indicates a confidence that (frenetic) human activity can
really improve things. Zimmerman admits that
Heidegger's attitude toward animals is not consistent:
at times he sees all entities as instances of physis, and
at other times he concludes that human beings are
radically different from animals and the rest of nature.
Animals, on this latter alternative, lack openness to
Being; hence, they cannot know that entities are. It is
crucial to notice, however, that any attempt to gain
consistency here would require an engagement with
certain biological and psychological phenomena (like
the central nervous system or the presence of pain), an
engagement which is, according to Heideggerian
reasoning, itself a type of activity and a type of Technik
which leads us further into a forgetfulness of Being.
As Heidegger continued to work his way out of
subjectivism and anthropocentrism, he made it harder
and harder to assess exactly where the similaribes and
differences are between human beings and animals and
how these similarities and differences have an impact
on ethical questions. It is decidedly not the case, as the
early Zimmerman alleges, that those who wish to extend
rights to animals can do so only by seeing them as lesser
human beings. In fact, animal rightists who defend the
argument from marginal cases are often criticized
because of their belief tllat many animals deserve more
respect than some human beings. 27
The later Zimmerman shows at least some
willingness to "make use of' available ethical theories,
including theories defending rights, to prevent
exploitation from occurring, but this is not his usual
view, which rests foursquare on deep ecology's
attachment to what Steve Sapontzis calls "total holism."
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To some extent, Heidegger was following his
predecessors Hegel and Nietzsche in claiming
that the world-historical individual is "beyond
good and evil." By portraying ethical matters
as secondary considerations which arise within
and which are limited to a particular historical
world, however, Heidegger ran the risk of
justifying whatever ethical form of life
happened to emerge in a world "founded" by
a new work of art. The demented "world" of
National Socialism reveals what may be
"justified" when artistic considerations are
allowed to triumph over supposedly outmoded
ethical ones. Heidegger's refusal to describe
his behavior between 1933 and 1945 in terms
of moral guilt stemmed from his belief that
his "ontological calling" to found a new world
removed him from the moral censure that
pertained only to ordinary people. Of course,
since the German people themselves were
"extraordinary" in being called to the
dangerous mission of founding a new world,
since they risked so much in this noble venture,
they too-in Heidegger's eyes-were not
morally culpable. 3o
Ethics for Heidegger was part and parcel of the
nihilistic modern age; hence, afortiori, ethical concern

31

Between the Species

Heidegger's Anti-Anthropocentrism

for animals is at best misplaced. The later Zimmerman
puts the point as follows:

Emperor Claudius.),fhat is, technological nihilism
engenders its opposite, as in the lines from Holderlin
of which Heidegger was fond: "Where the danger is,
grows the saving power also." It is convenient not only
for Heidegger the man but also for Heidegger the
philosopher to say that events in the various
slaughterhouses of Europe, in which all "cats" are
grey, are not due to real life individuals but to
Seinsvergessenheit. According to Wolin, one of the
reasons why Heidegger did not deal adequately with
real individuals was his fascination with the abstraction
"concreteness" and the abstraction "historicity" at the
expense of the concrete and historical:

Heidegger could never straightforwardly
admit that by "deconstructing" what he
regarded as the Enlightenment's insidious
principles of universal economic and political
rights, by declaring that traditional JudeoChristian moral beliefs had been vacated by
the death of God, by claiming that new
historical worlds arise from a primal source
that is "beyond good and evil," and by working
to found such a world based on artisticontological, not moral considerations, he
helped to make possible the triumph of a truly
radical evil. 31

There is no smaIl measure of irony that such
short-comings must be attributed to a thinker
whose claim to philosophical originality in the
1920s was based on an avowed revival of the
dimension of existential concreteness that was
otherwise so lacking in modem philosophy; a
thinker whose great achievement was a
purported reincorporation of "history"-via
the category of "historicity"-into modem
philosophical discourse. In truth, it is the
essential facts of twentieth-century political
life that Heidegger, time and again, shows
himself incapable of comprehending. 34

Although tlle later Zimmerman at least claims to be
opposed to Heidegger's denigration of ethics, his deep
ecological principles lead him to a "biocentric
egalitarianism" wherein we are supposed to "love and
respect all things," and presumably to love and respect
them equally, if Zimmerman is serious about his
egalitarianism. In short, we are likely to be left with an
analogous sort of leveling gaze in the later Zimmerman
that\ve are left with in Ule later Heidegger. I would like
to make it abundantly clear that Zimmerman is no
fascist, even if he is open to Tom Regan's charge of
"environmental fascism." But neither Heidegger nor
Zinunerman get off their respective hooks by claiming
that the death camps and factory farms alike are
predictable outcomes of the reckless power impulse of
the Enlightenment without also confronting, as
Zimmerman to some extent does, the liberatory gains
made possible by tlle Enlightenment, gains whose
beneficiaries include peas~mts, slaves, blacks, women,
and belatedly, animals. It is no accident that the most
widely read book written by a philosopher on the topic
of animal "rights" is titled "Animal Liberation."32
Heidegger's (inconsistently applied) strategy of
avoidance of ethical distinctions is revelatory not only
biographically but also philosophically, in that it is
necessitated by his belief that "the world must be forced
to collapse and the earth must be driven to desolation"33
before primal truth can be recaptured. Hence, factory
fa.'1l1s and crematoria may actually be welcomed by
Heidegger, if they help to bring about a turning away
from Technik and a turning toward authentic techne (as
art). (In Ulis regard, Heidegger looks like a latter day
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Jurgen Habermas also thinks that Heidegger's
etherealness (which Heidegger's followers confuse with
profundity) is part of the problem:
Because Being withdraws itself from the
assertive grasp of descriptive statements,
because it can only be encircled in indirect
discourse and "rendered silent," the destinings
of Being remain undiscoverable. The
propositionally contentless speech about
Being has, nevertheless, the illocutionary sense
of demanding resignation to fate. Its practicalpolitical side consists in the perlocutionary
effect of a diffuse readiness to obey in relation
to an indeterminate authority. 35
The eclipse of practical reason is no boon to human
beings or animals or the natural environment. Wolin
once again is perceptive regarding Heidegger's views
in a quotation which is well worth the consideration of
animal rightists:
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That is, tllere are good reasons for defending tlle
animal rights variety of anti-antllropocentrism, ratller
tilan tlle deep ecology version, especially when we
find deep ecologists-but not Zimmermanspeaking favorably of Malthus or AIDS. Two quite
different animal rightists can be used together to
detail the defects in deep ecological antianthropocentrism, in general, and its Heideggerian
variety, in particular: Tom Regan and Steve
Sapontzis. Regan has ably shown, I tllink, tllat not
all living tllings are subjects-of-a-life; hence, living
tllings are not to he viewed as having tlle same moral
status. It may be the case that there are individuals
who are not subjects-of-a-life but who do have
inherent value of some sort:

Rather than attempting to isolate the process
whereby instrumental reason, as tied to tile
forces of the modern economy, has been
elevated to the status of an end in itself at the
expense of its practical corollary, his
theoretical orientation seeks instead to promote

a rejection of rationality in totO. 36
Even if, as the argument from marginal cases indicates,
tllere is no simple way of asserting tilat tile value of
every human life is superior to tllat of every animal,
Wolin is nonetlleless correct in suggesting that there is
something worse tilan useless in a misology which
culminates in an incapacity to distinguish llinong the
slaughter of a rational humllil being, tlle slaughter of a
nonrational yet sentient animal, and tile felling of a tree
or tlle damming of a river. 3?

the very possibility of developing a genuine
ethic of the environment, as distinct from an
ethic for its use, turns on the possibility of
making the case that natural objects, though
they do not meet the subject-of-a-life criterion,
can nonetheless have inherent value. 38
But those who try to establish the case for inherent
value, he thinks, have their work cut out for them even
if tlle task is not impossible. Altllough Heideggerians
may be (unwittingly) correct, at least with respect to
wild animals, to simply let them be, there is a
considerable difficulty involved when trying to
reconcile the individualistic nature of moral rights witll
tile total holistic view of Heideggerian deep ecologists:
It is difficult to see how thc notion of the rights
of tlle individual could find a home witllin a
view that, emotive connotations to one side,
might be fairly dubbed "environmental
fascism." To use Leopold's telling phrase, man
is only a member of tlle biotic team."39

4. Individual Animals.
The upshot of tlle previous section is tllat:
a. Zimmennan has oone an excellent job of indicating
what tlle implications of Heidegger's tllOught are
for animals, in particular, and for tlle environment,
in general;

Heidegger's own case indicates how close a connection
there is between environmental fascism and fascism per
se; hence, tllere is notlling histrionic in Regan's use of
the tenn "fascism":

b. the later Zimmennan makes at least some progress
witll respect to criticism of Heidegger's thought
in tllis regard; but

If, to take an extreme, fanciful but, it is hoped,
not unfair exarnple, tlle situation we faced was
eitller to kill a rare wildflower or a (plentiful)
human being, and if tlle wildflower, as a 'tearn
member," would contribute more to the

c. even the later Zimmennan fails to emphasize, llild
tllis due to his commitment to deep ecology, tlle
dmlgers involved in a denigration of rights llild/or
concern for sentient individuals.
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integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic
community than the human, then presumably
we would not be doing wrong if we killed the
human and saved the wildflower. The rights
view cannot abide this position... because it
denies the propriety of deciding what should
be done to individuals who have rights by
appeal to aggregati ve considerations ....
Environmentai fascism and the rights view arc
like oil and water: they don't mix. 4o

to premodern existence, wherein lies a more symbiotic
relationship with the natural environment, a dream
which might be taken -:fl.ore seriously if Callicott and
Heidegger were not:
fundamentally out of touch with contemporary
morality, which emphasizes compassion for the
injured, the sick, and the handicapped, tolerance
for diverse ways of life, concern to expand the
diversity of opportunities and experiences
available to people, protecting the weak against
the strong, and hope for progress. 42

Although Sapontzis' version of anti-anthropocentrism
is very often at odds with Regan's, they complement each
other in the effort to show the defects in deep ecological
anti-anthropocentrism, particularly in its Heideggerian
variety. Considering tlle long-term well-being of human
beings and of animals includes a healthy supply of
oxygen, rich soil, etc. Parking lots and plastic trees do
not contribute to healthy animal life. Sapontzis is correct
in claiming that there is a false dilemma between
individualism and holism. Rights theory, utilitarianism,
virtue-based ethics, and Sapontzis' own version ofethical
scepticism are alike in being panially holistic. The total
holism of (early and late) Zinunerman or of J. Baird
Callicott, wherein the good of the biotic community is
the ultimate measure of ethical value is, if not a type of
fascism, at the very least a type of indifference to the
suffering of animals and of human beings:

And this progress, on the animal rightist's version of antianthropocentrism, is more likely to occur if we were to:
consider the case of the dog: even if no other
sentient being values it (or could value it),
the dog can still have feelings of well-being
about itself and its condition and can,
therefore, still be of value for itself. Thus,
the dog can be valued not only by anoilier,
either as an instrument or for itself; the dog
can also be valued by itself, and it is that latter
possibility, and the moral significance of it,
that is at issue in the debate over animal rights
and that is completely lacking in the case of
nonsentient entities. 43

The common moral goal of reducing the
suffering in life and otherwise making life
more enjoyable and fulfilling would not
obviously be more etIectively pursued by
valuing individuals only as contributors to a
community. Indeed, since it is individuals, not
communities, that experience enjoyment,
fulfillment, distress, and frustration, and since
total holism proposes regarding individuals as
disposable items in the pursuit of the integrity,
stability, and beauty of the community, it
seems reasonable to conclude that total
holism would not provide as likely a path to
this moral goal as our current, mixed
morality, which directly values individuals
and their quality of life. 41

It is not the case, as Callicott and the early
Zimmerman allege, that emphasis on individual rights
and on only partial holism will necessarily mean
destruction of the natural environment: nonsentient parts'
of nature have aesthetic and symbolic significance;
they have life-support and economic and recreational
value; they have scientific and historical and religious
inspiration value; they help us to build character and
to appreciate both the pretty and the sublime; etc.
Consequently, carrying on the work of animal
protection and reform does not require ascTibing direct
moral status to nonsentient entities. 44 That is, once we
abandon the Heideggerian and deep ecological belief
in "biocentric egalitarianism," as Zimmerman refers to
it, we are not necessarily committed to the belief iliat
nonsentient beings have value only as natural resources.
It is not clear to me that Heidegger's "egalitarianism,"
if that is the word for the perverse position he defends,
can help human beings or animals or, for that matter,
nonsentient nature. If help is to be given, it is most likely

Jews and Poles and cows and deer suffer, notcowhood
or an ecosystem or the Heimat. In addition, Callicott,
like some Heideggerians, wistfully dreams of a return
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to come from the creative tension among the thoughts
of rights theorists like Regan, utilitarians like Peter
Singer,45 virtue theorists like Stephen R. L. Clark,46
metaphysicians like Charles Hmtshome, and moral
sceptics like Sapontzis.
By failing to acknowledge Heidegger as a source
of wisdom regarding anti-anthropocentrism, I am
perhaps open to the charge that I mn engaging in a
logic of contamination: Heidegger's thought leads to
fascism and deep ecology, therefore deep ecology is
fascist But this is not exactly my view. Rather, I am
claiming that deep ecology is not necessarily fascist,
even if it is a very real possibility Ulat it degenerate
into environmental (if not real) fascism. The strong
connection between environmental ~md real fascism,
on the one hand, and deep ecology, on the oUler, lies in
the fact that they both commit the fallacy of misplaced
concreteness, and they commit it in tile same way. This
fallacy consists in treating abstractions as if they were
concrete particulars. BOlh fascists and deep ecologists
have been found to say at one point or another that "The
individual by himself counts for nothing," as when
Heidegger claims that:

But there are still some areas even in the later
Zimmerman that are likely to bother animal rightists and
political liberals. There is perhaps good reason for
Zimmennan to encourage not the destruction of but rather
the surpassing of the ego as part of the "emancipation"
of nature, but such an emancipation would have to occur
before the need for rights is surpassed. For example, in
the most recent Zimmennan we fmd him criticizing the
radical deep ecologist Christopher Manes for abandoning
rights, but only because Manes does so without a trace
of irony, as if such an abandonment would be tolerable
if done ironically. Zimmennan also implicitly denigrates
rights when he repeatedly refers to his position as a
biocentric egalitarianism: are we to assume that certain
rocks or grasses are morally equal to cows and human
beings? We are not told. And in the most recent
Zimmennan, the word "rights" is still placed in scare
quotes. 50 When a utilitarian does this I am bothered, but
at least I understand why the utilitarian uses the scare
quotes; when Heideggerians like Zimmennan do so. I
develop a nervous twitch. 51 Perhaps in Zimmennan's
future writings he will indicate:
a. a bit more clearly where he stands on the problem
of the one and the many as it relates to antianthropocentrism issues and

Since tile beginning of my installation, the
initial principle and the authentic aim [of my
Rektorat] ...reside in the radical transfonnation
of intellectual education into a function of the
forces and demands of the National Socialist
state.... One cannot presume [to know] what
will remain of our transitory works.... The
only certainty is that our fierce will, inclined
toward the future, gives a meaning and brings
support to our most simple effort. The
individual by himself counts for notlling. It is
the destiny of our nation incamated by its state
that matters. 47

b. whether I am correct in claiming that because of
his Heideggerian deep ecology he is, at present,
at best a lukewann defender of the many sentient
individuals about us.
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